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A HARD LOOK AT MORAL PERCEPTION 
David Faraci 
 
This paper concerns what I take to be the primary epistemological motivation for 
defending moral perception.1 Offering a plausible account of how we gain moral 
knowledge is one of the central challenges of metaethics. It seems moral perception 
might help us meet this challenge. The possibility that we know about the 
instantiation of moral properties in something like the way we know that there is a 
bus passing in front of us raises the alluring prospect of subsuming moral 
epistemology under the (relatively) comfortable umbrella of perceptual or, more 
broadly, empirical knowledge.2 
The good news on this front is that various combinations of metaethical 
positions and theories of perception arguably have the potential to vindicate moral 
perception (though I won’t do much to defend this claim here).3 The bad news, I’ll 
argue, is that such vindication is only half the battle where this epistemological goal 
is concerned. And the other half of the battle is unlikely to be won. 
 
1. The Other Half of the Battle 
Nearly everyone agrees that we can perceive “low-level” properties including 
spatial properties, color, shape, motion and illumination. It is more controversial 
whether we can perceive “high-level” properties like being a bus or, relevantly for 
our purposes, being wrong.4 I will assume that we can perceive at least some high-
level properties, since if we cannot, the question of moral perception’s 
                                                 
1 As opposed to, for instance, phenomenological motivations. For a recent critique of moral 
perception along these lines, see Väyrynen (m.s.). 
2 I focus on perception of “thin” moral properties—good, bad, right, wrong, etc. It’s controversial 
whether perception of thicker moral properties counts as moral perception. See, e.g., Väyrynen 
(2013). Even if it does, one could use thick moral perception to develop a purely perceptual 
moral epistemology only if thin moral knowledge is grounded in thick moral knowledge. I 
highly doubt this, though I cannot argue against it here. 
3 In addition to other works discussed herein, Väyrynen (m.s.) mentions defenses of moral 
perception from Audi (2013), Blum (1994), Chappell (2008), Cowan (forthcoming), Cullison 
(2010), Cuneo (2003), DePaul (1993), Greco (2000), McNaughton (1988), and Watkins and Jolley 
(2002). 
4 The list of low-level properties is borrowed from Siegel (2011). Siegel’s is a list of “non-kind” 
properties (as opposed to “kind” properties). This is the same distinction—or, at least, non-kind 
properties and low-level properties are the same, and kind properties are a subset of the high-
level properties. The low-/high-level phrasing is borrowed from Werner (forthcoming). 
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epistemological implications is moot.5 I further assume that perceptual experiences 
can be distinguished (for one) by their phenomenal content.6 
A few more preliminaries: “Perception of X” is ambiguous between (for one) 
“perception explained by X” and “perception grounded in an experience with 
distinctively X-like phenomenal content.”7 Respectively, these are the senses in 
which Lois Lane does and does not perceive Superman when she sees Clark Kent. 
Given that my interest is epistemological, I will be using “perception of X” 
exclusively in the latter, intensional sense. As I’m using it, “perception of X” is also 
not a success term—one can have a false perception of X.  
When I speak of X-like experiences or experiences as of X, I mean 
experiences with distinctively X-like phenomenal content. Where X is in some class 
C, I will sometimes talk about C perceptions or experiences—e.g., being wrong is a 
moral property, so a perception of wrongness is a moral perception, and an 
experience as of wrongness is a moral experience.  
I will not offer a full theory of what it is for phenomenal content to be X-
like. Roughly, the idea is that the phenomenal content of an X-like experience bears 
an important kind of similarity relation to certain recognizable features of X.8 For 
example, the phenomenal content of a square-like experience—an experience as of a 
                                                 
5 For grammatical simplicity, I will sometimes talk of properties as objects—e.g., say that Norm 
perceives some behavior, rather than perceiving that something instantiates the property of 
behaving in some particular way, or that Vera perceives a bus, rather than that she perceives 
that something instantiates the property of being a bus. This should not be taken as a leap to 
assuming that we can perceive objects independently of their properties (though I do not deny 
this, either.) 
6 For defense—as well as arguments that this claim is compatible with views it is typically taken 
to be in tension with, such as naïve realism—see Siegel (2011, chap. 2). 
7 What is the difference between perception of X and experience as of X? First, I take it 
perceptions of X need to have a certain kind of “cognitive basicness.” Presumably, both optimists 
and skeptics about mental state perception would grant that there can be experiences as of 
anger. Their disagreement would be over whether such experiences ground or are grounded in 
judgements about anger. Second, for the optimist, a perception of anger is at an intermediate 
“cognitive level” between an experience as of anger and an anger-judgement. This allows for the 
possibility of having an experience as of X without perceiving X—say, if I know I’m in a context 
where there are likely to be a lot of fake Xs. This bit about “cognitive level” is intentionally left 
vague. It serves only to make certain points more intuitive (I hope); nothing substantive is meant 
to hang on it. 
8 Which features? Answering this question is difficult. For instance, it can’t just be those 
features that explain the experience. For, intuitively, it seems that a quotidian experience of 
water is water-like, but not H20-like. For the same reason, it can’t be those features that we 
associate with the object of experience—at least not given that some people know that water is 
H20. I suspect the answer has something to do with the features that allow the experiences to 
meet criteria set by our concepts, but I won’t explore this further here.  
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square—bears certain structural similarities to key recognizable features of actual 
squares. Arguably, an experience as of a square has the same phenomenal content 
as a particular kind of experience as of a rectangle—i.e., one where the rectangle 
seems to be equilateral. I take it that someone who lacks the concept ‘rectangle’ 
might have an experience as of a square without having an experience as of a 
rectangle. Thus, “experience as of X” is also intensional. 
Begin with a simple case. Norm and Vera are driving through the country. A 
bus cuts them off, and Vera becomes irate. Norm sees that she is angry, and tries to 
comfort her.  
Some will accept that Norm really does perceive that Vera is angry. Perhaps 
before Norm knew Vera as well as he does now, the phenomenology of seeing her 
reaction would have been different from how it is now. The best explanation for 
this “phenomenal contrast” might be that Norm is now perceiving her anger.9 
Others will deny this. They might hold, instead, that Norm perceives only that Vera 
is scowling, judging that she is angry on the basis of that perception.10 
Suppose a skeptic about mental state perception is trying to account for 
Norm’s knowledge that Vera is angry. On the skeptical view just described, there is 
an important epistemological relationship between Norm’s judgement that Vera is 
angry and his perception of her scowl. Norm infers (or in some other way “shifts”11) 
from perception of that scowl to a judgement about her mental state. For this 
inference to have epistemic merit, Norm must possess some background knowledge 
about connections between Vera’s facial expressions and her mental states.12 
Crucially, the epistemological story for optimists about mental state 
perception is unlikely to differ much from the skeptic’s. Assuming Norm isn’t 
telepathic, his perception of Vera’s mental state is clearly grounded in his 
experience of her behavior: He perceives anger because he has an experience as of a 
                                                 
9 This argument mimics the phenomenal contrast arguments Siegel (2011) deploys to defend 
perception of various complex properties. Werner (forthcoming) deploys such an argument to 
defend moral perception. Werner’s argument comes up again in §2.3. 
10 I’m assuming here that Norm might judge Vera to be angry partly on the basis of her 
behavior. This is roughly in line with the “theory theory” about judgements concerning others’ 
mental states. In contrast, according to “simulation theory,” Norm might judge that Vera is 
angry after running through empathetic processing starting with the same input (the bus cutting 
them off). I set simulation theory aside because it doesn’t seem compatible with mental state 
perception, which I’m focusing on for illustrative purposes. (For one thing, Vera’s mental state 
plays no role in the simulation theoretic explanation of Norm’s judgement.) For an overview of 
simulation theory as a reaction to the theory theory, see Gordon (2009). 
11 I take no position here on whether sub-personal processing can count as inferential.  
12 Or, at least, beliefs that themselves have some epistemic merit (e.g., are justified). 
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scowl. For this relation to have epistemic merit, Norm must again possess some 
background knowledge of a relation between scowls and anger.13 
In terms used in the current literature on perception, we may say that 
optimism about epistemically successful mental state perception relies on cognitive 
penetration14—Norm’s perception of Vera’s anger must be cognitively penetrated by 
background knowledge15 that scowls indicate anger (in Vera).16 I will say that 
Norm’s perception of her anger is mediated by this knowledge.17 
                                                 
13 Since I completed the paper, a number of people have suggested that this knowledge 
requirement is too strong. Perhaps Norm is justified in believing that Vera is angry simply 
because perception is a basic source of justification. And perhaps the explanation for the 
reliability of that perception is just the fact of some relationship between Vera’s facial 
expressions and her mental states. What I want to insist on, though, is that in order for Norm’s 
perception to ground knowledge, whatever explains the reliability of that perception must in 
some sense be available to him. If the explanans can be relevantly available to Norm without his 
believing it, then perhaps the knowledge requirement is too strong. But I am confident that 
shifting from a knowledge requirement to an availability requirement would make little 
difference to my arguments herein.  
Of course, some—e.g., externalists or coherentists—might reject even the availability 
requirement. But then Norm’s is just the sort of case that is frequently used to challenge 
externalism: It seems implausible that an agent can know something when the reliability of his 
route to that knowledge is deeply mysterious (at least to him). See, e.g., Bonjour’s (1980) case of 
Norman the Clairvoyant. As for coherentism: If Norm is sensible, he will recognize the need to 
explain the reliability of his perception. It seems unlikely that his perception-based belief that 
Vera is angry would cohere with his belief that the reliability of his perception of her anger is 
deeply mysterious. For application of externalism and coherentism to moral knowledge see, e.g., 
Shafer-Landau (2005) and Sayre-McCord (1996), respectively.   
14 I first encountered this phrase in Siegel (2011), though I owe my use of it Werner 
(forthcoming), who uses it to make points similar to those made here about why moral 
perception alone can’t vindicate a purely perceptual moral epistemology. 
15 Since I’m only interested in epistemically successful cases, I’ll continue to refer to background 
knowledge, rather than beliefs, though arguably one can have perceptions that involve cognitive 
penetration even by false beliefs. 
16 This is a case of what we might call augmenting penetration, where background knowledge 
leads an experience as of Y to ground perception of X. This can be contrasted with what we 
might call undercutting penetration, where background knowledge prevents an experience as of Y 
that otherwise would ground perception of X from doing so. For instance, if Norm learned Vera 
was an android, he might cease seeing her as angry. Except where noted, discussion herein is 
limited to augmenting perception.  
17 I trust my decision not to have my paper riddled with talk of penetration is self-explanatory. 
Note that it may also be possible for perceptions to be mediated by non-cognitive attitudes. This 
might be relevant for those who take certain affective states to themselves be perceptions of 
moral properties. See, e.g., Oddie (2009) and McBrayer (2010a; 2010b). My arguments apply as 
well to affective states as to cognitive ones. If Norm’s perception of Vera’s anger is mediated by 
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So, in developing an epistemology of (others’) mental states, both optimists 
and skeptics about mental state perception have to account for certain background 
knowledge—e.g., explain how we know that certain behaviors implicate certain 
mental states. If the optimist hopes to develop a purely perceptual mental state 
epistemology, it follows that she must show that the relevant background 
knowledge is itself perceptual.  
At least for the sake of argument, I grant the optimist about moral 
perception that there is perception of moral properties. However, as with 
perception of others’ mental states, I argue that moral perception would have to be 
mediated by background knowledge of relations between moral and non-moral 
properties, which I refer to as moral bridge principles. The other half of the battle, 
for champions of a purely perceptual moral epistemology, is thus to show that 
knowledge of moral bridge principles is itself perceptual. I argue that this cannot be 
the case. It follows that even if there is moral perception, we almost certainly must 
give up hope of developing a purely perceptual moral epistemology. 
 
2. Against Unmediated Moral Perception  
Sarah McGrath (2004) argues, much as I have, that we shouldn’t be content with 
showing that moral perception exists in some sense. Rather, as she puts it, we 
should hope to learn whether we have any moral knowledge by perception. She 
thinks we sometimes do have such knowledge. Consider one of her examples:  
[S]uppose Alice believes that homosexuality is wrong, and that she 
believes this because she has learned that the scriptures say that 
homosexuality is wrong, and believes that the scriptures are 
authoritative on this matter. But then she gets to know a couple, Bob 
and Chuck, who live next door. She gradually comes to believe that 
it is not wrong for them to be in this relationship. It isn’t that she 
comes to believe this because she detects some non-moral features 
that she believes are sufficient for having a morally permissible 
relationship—she doesn’t change her mind because she learns that 
these people are monogamous, or that they prioritize each other’s 
needs. According to the moral principles that Alice believes, these 
sorts of non-moral facts would be insufficient for having a 
relationship that is morally permissible. Alice simply comes to 
                                                                                                                                     
an affective state, rather than a cognitive one, we would still require a story about how that 
affective state epistemically vindicates the grounding relation between Norm’s experience as of 
a scowl and his perception of anger: Norm would still need to “know,” in some sense, that scowls 
implicate anger.  
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believe that there is nothing wrong with this relationship, on the 
basis of her acquaintance with Bob and Chuck. (McGrath 2004, 224–
225) 
McGrath denies that Alice perceives the permissibility of Bob and Chuck’s 
relationship “because she detects some non-moral features that she believes are 
sufficient for having a morally permissible relationship.” It isn’t clear, though, that 
McGrath can simply stipulate this. Suppose Norm claims to know by perception 
that Vera is anger, but denies that this is because he detects aspects of her behavior 
he believes to indicate that she’s angry. Unless he is telepathic, this is impossible. 
Here’s a more detailed version of the argument from §1: 
P1. [Mediation] If perceptions of X are grounded in experiences as 
of Y, then perceptions of X produce knowledge only if they are 
mediated by background knowledge of some relation between X and 
Y.18 
P2. In epistemically successful cases, and barring telepathy, 
perceptions of others’ mental states are grounded in experiences as 
of behavioral cues.  
C1. Therefore, in epistemically successful cases, and barring 
telepathy, perceptions of others’ mental states are mediated by 
background knowledge of some relation between certain behavioral 
cues and the relevant mental states. 
P3. Norm’s perception of Vera’s anger is a perception of another’s 
mental state. 
C2. Therefore, barring telepathy, Norm’s perception of Vera’s anger 
is epistemically successful only if it is mediated by relevant 
background knowledge—presumably, that her behavior suggests she 
is angry.  
If we are to grant McGrath that Alice’s case, as described, is possible, 
something must block an analogous line of reasoning with respect to moral 
perception. In §2.1, I argue for the moral analogue of P2: Epistemically successful 
                                                 
18 This is not to say that the perception and the experience must actually be separate. It might be 
that certain aspects of an overall experiential state with one phenomenal character are grounded 
in other aspects of that same overall experiential state with a different phenomenal character. I 
am also not assuming that there is only one unique phenomenal content that counts as being as 
of permissibility—only that experiences as of permissibility and experiences as of the relevant base 
properties have different phenomenal contents. More on this in §2.2. 
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perceptions of moral properties are always grounded in non-moral experiences. In 
§2.2, I consider an objection and revise the argument to accommodate it. This 
illuminates a path of resistance for the optimist about epistemically successful 
unmediated moral perception (from here I frequently drop the “epistemically 
successful” qualifier). In §2.3, I offer some reasons to think that path is closed. 
 
2.1 An Argument that Moral Perception is Grounded in Non-Moral Experience 
Suppose Norm accepts the above argument, but claims that he is telepathic, and 
thus that his mental state perceptions are not grounded in behavioral experiences. 
Here’s one way we might test his claim: Construct a counterfactual scenario much 
like the one discussed in §1, but make the minimal changes necessary to remove the 
anger: Norm and Vera are driving along, a bus cuts them off, Vera scowls, shouts, 
etc., and Norm sees this. But it’s all a setup: Vera knew the bus was going to be 
there, and is behaving just as she would were she actually angry (she’s a very good 
actor) so as to test Norm’s claim that he is telepathic. If Norm perceives anger just 
as he did in the original case, this suggests that his perception of anger is explained 
by his experience of her behavior.  
Nick Sturgeon deploys a similar counterfactual test in a famous exchange 
with Gil Harman, on the topic of moral explanations of moral judgements.19 
Harman offers a case in which someone comes upon a group of children torturing a 
cat for fun. The onlooker—call him Sam—perceives that the children are doing 
something wrong. Harman argues that Sam’s moral perception can be fully 
explained by Sam’s non-moral experience in combination with his background 
moral beliefs, and thus the wrongness itself does no explanatory work. 
Sturgeon rebuts with a counterfactual test: He introduces a counterfactual 
scenario that differs from the original to the minimal extent necessary to remove 
the wrongness, then asks whether Sam’s experience responds to that change. If Sam 
no longer experiences what he sees as wrong, it seems his experience is (perhaps 
directly) responsive to the presence (absence) of wrongness. Sam passes the test. 
For were we to alter the situation’s moral qualities—say by having the children pet 
the cat instead of torturing it—Sam’s experience would undoubtedly change. 
It is not hard to see why we might be suspicious of this result. I 
characterized the test in terms of constructing counterfactual scenarios that differ 
“to the minimal extent necessary to remove the wrongness.” Unfortunately, moral 
supervenience entails that “the minimal extent necessary” requires altering the base 
properties along with the moral ones. And so it is possible that it is the change in 
                                                 
19 The exchange begins with Harman (1977). Sturgeon responds in his (1986). This went back-
and-forth a bit; next is Harman (1986).  
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those base properties, rather than the change in the moral properties themselves—
i.e., the fact that the cat is now being pet rather than tortured—that explains the 
change in Sam’s experience.20 What we may well have discovered, then, is not that 
Sam passes an important test, but rather that because moral properties supervene, 
the test can’t function properly in moral cases.21 
Luckily, we can do better. For our concern isn’t whether moral properties 
explain moral perceptions, but rather whether moral perceptions are grounded in 
non-moral experiences. Thus, our question in this case is not whether wrongness 
itself explains Sam’s moral perception, but whether Sam’s experience as of certain 
non-moral features of cat-torture grounds that perception.  
To see why the counterfactual test is still useful, return briefly to Norm. The 
fact that Norm continues to see Vera as angry in the counterfactual case strongly 
suggests that her behaviors explain his perception of anger. This suggest the 
principle: 
Explanation   If perceptions of X track the presence of Y even in 
the absence of X, the best explanation is that the presence of Y 
explains perceptions of X.  
Explanation doesn’t seem to cut much ice in the moral case when we 
substitute some base property for Y, because it isn’t possible for Y to be present 
while X (the moral property) is absent.22 But there is another way to think about the 
results of this test in terms of the phenomenal content of Norm’s experience, rather 
than in terms of what, externally, explains his perception. It seems safe to assume 
that when Norm sees Vera’s behaviors, he has an experience as of those behaviors. 
The fact that Norm continues to see Vera as angry in the counterfactual case 
strongly suggests that his experience as of her behavior grounds his perception of 
her mental state. This motivates the more specific principle: 
Grounding   If perceptions of X track experiences as of Y even in 
the absence of X, the best explanation is that perceptions of X are 
grounded in experiences as of Y.  
Crucially, while we can’t remove the wrongness from Sam’s case without 
removing certain non-moral features, we can remove the wrongness while retaining 
something that will produce in Sam an experience as of those non-moral features. 
                                                 
20 This assumes that the base properties and moral properties aren’t, in fact, the same properties. 
I return to this issue in §2.2. 
21 David Slutsky (2001) argues that the test can be improved, by considering cases where the 
relevant non-moral base properties are causally inefficacious. There are a number of parallels 
between his argument and my own. 
22 Though again see Slutsky (2001). 
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That is, we can construct a convincing fake: an animatronic cat, holographic fire, 
etc., etc. Surely, Sam would continue to experience what he sees as wrong.23 
Grounding thus suggests that Sam’s moral experience in this case is grounded in 
his non-moral experience. If the counterfactual test gives the same results in all 
such cases—if Sam’s moral perceptions consistently track certain non-moral 
experiences even when the relevant moral properties are absent—the best 
explanation seems to be that his non-moral experiences consistently ground his 
moral perceptions.24  
This brings us back to McGrath’s case: Suppose it turns out that Alice’s 
neighbors are in fact not a gay couple, but rather (unbeknownst to Alice) two 
heterosexual method actors preparing for an upcoming performance. Surely, Alice’s 
views about gay marriage would shift just as they did in McGrath’s original case. 
And surely this is because Alice’s perception of permissibility is grounded in her 
experiences as of certain non-moral features of Bob and Chuck’s relationship.  
Crucially, none of this relies on the details of the particular cases under 
consideration. Something similar seems true about every case involving every moral 
property. Schematically, take any epistemically successful case in which person P 
perceives some moral property M in the presence of some set of non-moral 
properties N. I submit that in every case, were we to remove M, convincingly fake 
some subset of N, and change nothing else, P would falsely perceive M. If we can 
indeed expect this in every case, we should conclude that all epistemically 
successful moral perception is grounded in non-moral experience.25  
                                                 
23 One incredible alternative would be that Sam judges the cat-torture to be fake on the basis of 
failure to perceive wrongness! 
24 I’m simplifying slightly. It is controversial whether the experience caused by the fake cat-
torture has the same phenomenal content as that caused by the real. However, given that the 
fake cat-torture is convincing, we may suppose the contents of the experiences caused by the real 
and fake cat-tortures are in principle indistinguishable to Sam. The counterfactual test thus 
suggests that Sam’s moral perception tracks experiences that are indistinguishable from 
experiences as of cat-torture better than they track the presence of wrongness. The best 
explanation for this seems to be that his falsidical moral perception is grounded in a non-moral 
experience that is indistinguishable from an experience as of cat-torture. And the best 
explanation for this seems to be that his veridical moral perception is grounded in his experience 
as of cat-torture. For simplicity’s sake, I will continue to speak as though the two have the same 
phenomenal contents. For those who reject this, “experience as of cat-torture” can be taken to 
refer both to cat-torture-like experiences and those that are indistinguishable from cat-torture-
like experiences. This makes no substantive difference to my arguments. 
25 The idea that this concerns every case is crucial. The point of the counterfactual test is not 
that if I can falsely perceive X, then perceptions of X are grounded in experiences as of some Y. I 
accept that there can be false unmediated perceptions, perhaps even of low-level properties.  
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We now have the makings of an argument that all epistemically successful 
moral perception is mediated: 
P1. [Mediation] If perceptions of X are grounded in experiences as 
of Y, then perceptions of X produce knowledge only if they are 
mediated by background knowledge of some relation between X and 
Y. 
P4. [Grounding] If perceptions of X track experiences as of Y even 
in the absence of X, the best explanation is that perceptions of X are 
grounded in experiences as of Y.  
P5. In epistemically successful cases, perceptions of moral properties 
track non-moral experiences even in the absence of the relevant 
moral properties.  
C3. Therefore, in epistemically successful cases, moral perception is 
mediated by background knowledge of some relation between moral 
and non-moral properties—i.e., of moral bridge principles. 
Assuming the argument is valid, my opponent has three options: First, 
challenge Mediation by arguing that a perception of X grounded in an experience 
as of Y might be epistemically successful even without being mediated by relevant 
background knowledge. Second, challenge Grounding with a competing 
explanation for the results of the counterfactual test. Third, challenge P5 by denying 
that the results of the counterfactual test would be as I’ve suggested. 
Mediation is highly intuitive: Suppose A’s perception of X is grounded in 
an experience as of Y. But suppose A also has no reason to think there’s any relation 
between X and Y. In that case, there seems to be no way A’s experience as of Y 
could produce knowledge about X. For the grounding relation in question could 
have no epistemic merit.26 Skipping to P5: Though this is technically an empirical 
matter, I have no doubt that the results of the counterfactual test would be as I’ve 
suggested. I thus set the possibility of rejecting these results aside. This leaves the 
option of proposing a competing explanation for the results of the counterfactual 
test. In §2.2, I consider one such explanation and revise the argument to 
accommodate it. In §2.3, I offer reasons for thinking the argument is sound, even so 
altered.  
 
 
 
                                                 
26 Though see note 13, above. 
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2.2 An Objection to and Revision of the Above Argument  
Return to Norm and Vera, but this time, focus on Vera’s perception of the bus. 
Vera’s perception of the bus is presumably grounded in an experience as of a bus. 
According to Mediation, it follows that Vera’s perception of the bus (assuming it is 
epistemically successful) must be mediated by background knowledge of a relation 
between the bus and itself. We could accept this, but it seems rather odd. First, it 
might seem that if there are any cases of unmediated perception, Vera’s will be one. 
Certainly, her perception seems more “direct” than Norm’s, Sam’s or Alice’s. So 
perhaps we should revise Mediation to exclude cases where X and Y are identical, 
as follows: 
Mediation*   If perceptions of X are grounded in experiences as of Y, 
and X and Y are non-identical, then perceptions of X produce 
knowledge only if they are mediated by background knowledge of 
some relation between X and Y. 
Mediation* would allow some to resist my argument that all moral 
perception is mediated—reductive naturalists, for instance. But Mediation* is too 
weak, for there are cases where epistemically successful perception of X does 
require mediation by knowledge of a relation between X and Y, even though X and 
Y are identical. To see this, consider the case of Cliff who, after stepping in a puddle 
of water, cries, “Ack! I’ve just gotten H20 all over my new shoes!”  
Distinguish two versions of this case: Cliff1 has the peculiar ability to see 
things at the molecular level, and thus experiences the stuff he steps in as groups of 
hydrogen and oxygen atoms. Cliff2, on the other hand, experiences that stuff as 
most of us would—as colorless, wet, etc. Insofar as Cliff2 perceives H20, it seems 
clear that his perception is grounded in his experience as of water (and thus 
mediated by background knowledge that water is H20). This is true even assuming 
being water and being H20 are the same property. 
The counterfactual test can help us determine which case we are dealing 
with. Suppose Cliff claims to be Cliff1, able to directly see molecular structure. 
Dubious, we head over to Twin Earth and get ourselves some XYZ. Given its causal 
properties, we can safely assume that XYZ will produce in Cliff an experience as of 
water—unless he has Cliff1’s “molecular sight.”27 
 We then recreate the original case, except this time Cliff steps in a puddle 
of XYZ. If he falsely perceives H20, this gives us reason to believe that he is Cliff2—
his perception of H20 is grounded in his experience as of water. Despite his 
protestations, his perception is thus almost certainly mediated—again, presumably 
                                                 
27 This is, of course, a reference to Putnam (1975). 
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by background knowledge that water is H20. (One more piece of intuitive evidence: 
Consider Cliff3, who is exactly like Cliff2 in every way, except Cliff3 lacks the belief 
that water is H20, though he possesses both concepts. Surely Cliff3—whether 
confronted with XYZ or with H20—wouldn’t perceive H20.) 
Cliff’s case shows that Mediation* is too weak because even though water 
and H20 are the same property, water-like experiences don’t have the same 
phenomenal content as H20-like experiences. This suggests that we should instead 
consider cases where two experiences do have the same phenomenal content. This 
brings us back to Vera’s perception of the bus. Here are three true claims about 
Vera: First, Vera perceives a bus. Second, Vera has an experience as of certain low-
level properties—shape, color, etc. Third, if there were no bus, but Vera had an 
experience as of those low-level properties—perhaps she was cut off by a motorcyclist 
wearing a very convincing bus-façade—she would falsely perceive a bus. Given this, 
Grounding suggests that Vera’s perception of the bus is grounded in her 
experience as of those low-level properties. Since something’s instantiating the 
relevant low-level properties does not guarantee that it instantiates the property of 
being a bus—after all, the bus-facade instantiates them, too!—both Mediation and 
Mediation* suggest that Vera’s perception of the bus must be mediated by 
background knowledge of some relation between those low-level properties and 
busses.  
This sounds wrong. Again, intuitively Vera’s perception of the bus is 
unmediated. I’ve already hinted at the explanation: It’s not clear that Vera’s 
experience as of those low-level properties has different phenomenal content from 
her experience as of a bus. It may just be that Vera can think about one content in 
two different ways—as bus-like or, more abstractly, as of various shapes, colors, 
etc.28  
                                                 
28 I’m not asserting that this is necessarily the case. I think it may turn out that Vera’s 
perception here is mediated by knowledge of a relation between certain low-level properties and 
the presence of busses. For it may be possible to have those low-level experiences but not see 
them as bus-like. Consider the relation between perception of a duck (or a rabbit) and 
experiences as of the low-level features of the duck-rabbit. Perhaps all high-level perceptions are 
like this, and so are all mediated. If that were the case, it would be even easier to reach my 
skeptical conclusion, so I make the optimist’s position stronger by assuming Vera’s perception 
might be as suggested here. The general point is that in cases where perceptions are 
unmediated—and surely, some are—one of two things must be happening: (1) There is some Y 
such that perceptions of X track experiences as of Y even in the absence of X, but experiences as 
of X and as of Y have the same phenomenal content (or, at least, indistinguishable—see note 24, 
above); or (2) There is no such Y, because illusory experiences of X are impossible. (This might 
be the case if certain mental states are luminous—if we can’t be mistaken which we are in. For an 
argument against this, see Williamson (2002).)  
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This suggests a way of resisting Grounding. It’s true that Vera’s 
perceptions of busses track her experiences as of certain low-level properties, even in 
the absence of busses. But the explanation for this seems not to be that the former is 
grounded in the latter. Rather, the explanation is that her perception is grounded in 
an experience as of a bus, and since that experience has the same phenomenal 
content as an experience as of certain low-level properties, anything that tracks the 
former is likely to track the latter as well. And, of course, given that illusions are 
possible, it’s no surprise that Vera’s perceptions of busses track bus-like experiences 
more reliably than they track busses. This motivates revision of Grounding (with a 
similar revision to Mediation29): 
Grounding*   If perceptions of X track experiences as of Y even in 
the absence of X, and experiences as of X have different 
phenomenal content from experiences as of Y, then the best 
explanation is that perceptions of X are grounded in experiences as 
of Y.  
Grounding* illuminates a way to resist the conclusion that all epistemically 
successful moral perception is mediated: Argue that some moral and non-moral 
experiences have the same phenomenal content. If certain experiences as of 
suffering have the same phenomenal content as certain experiences as of wrongness, 
then the fact that Sam’s perceptions of wrongness track his experiences as of 
suffering even in the absence of wrongness is unremarkable. It causes no more 
epistemic trouble than the fact that Vera’s perceptions of busses track both her 
experiences as of certain low-level properties and as of busses even in the absence of 
busses.30 
I highly doubt that any moral and non-moral experiences have the same 
phenomenal content. In §2.3, I’ll offer some reasons to share my doubt. However, I 
admit what I say there may not be decisive. Thus, the conclusion of §2 is 
conditional: If moral and non-moral experiences have different phenomenal 
contents, then the counterfactual test shows that epistemically successful moral 
perceptions are grounded in non-moral experiences. It would follow that moral 
                                                 
29 We need to change Mediation if we are to avoid the conclusion that a perception of X 
grounded in an experience as of X must be mediated by knowledge of a relation between X and 
itself. It’s also worth noting that if experiences with the same phenomenal content are identical, 
only Mediation needs to be amended, for if X-like and Y-like experiences are identical, it is 
trivial that a perception grounded in one is grounded in the other. Framing things as I do is 
meant to make it easier to raise certain objections to my arguments.  
30 This is not to say, of course, that there are no puzzles about how experiences as of X generate 
knowledge about X, given the possibility of illusions, only that these puzzles would pose no 
special problem for moral perception.   
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perception can only produce moral knowledge insofar as it is mediated by 
background knowledge of moral bridge principles.  
 
2.3 Some Reasons to Think Moral and Non-Moral Experiences Have Different 
Phenomenal Contents 
I have suggested that the optimist about unmediated moral perception might argue 
that some moral and non-moral experiences have the same phenomenal content. If 
so, we should expect and be untroubled by the fact that epistemically successful 
moral perceptions track certain non-moral experiences. Crucially, though, we 
should also expect that some epistemically successful non-moral perceptions will 
track certain moral experiences. For example, suppose all and only pleasure is good, 
and that experiences as of goodness and experiences as of pleasure have the same 
phenomenal content. Suppose unmediated perceptions of goodness are grounded in, 
and therefore track, experiences as of goodness. Barring exceptional cases, we 
should thus expect that perceptions of goodness will also track experiences as of 
pleasure. But this goes both ways. So we should also expect that, barring exceptional 
cases, perceptions of pleasure will track experiences as of goodness. This suggests 
that people would rarely, if ever, perceive pleasure without having an experience as 
of goodness.31 
I have no knock-down argument against this. But I will say a few things 
about why I doubt it. First, note that neither of the moral cases discussed so far 
provides any help to my opponent here. Start with Sam. Somewhat ironically, there 
is an argument for moral perception that relies explicitly on the idea that an 
experience as of cat-torture is phenomenally distinct from an experience of its 
wrongness. Preston Werner (forthcoming) asks us to consider two characters: One 
is like Sam. The other, Pathos, is an “EEDI”: Someone who has “a fully-functioning 
‘theory of mind’ . . . but who nonetheless lack[s] affective empathy in the sense that 
they fail to have ‘an emotional response to another individual that is congruent 
with the other’s emotional reaction’.”32 Werner points out that there would almost 
certainly be a phenomenal difference between Sam’s experience of cat-torture and 
the EEDI’s. Werner further “contend[s] that the best explanation is a difference in 
the perception of moral properties—[Sam]’s experience represents the cat’s burning 
as [wrong], whereas Pathos’s does not.” If Werner is right, then it seems perfectly 
                                                 
31 Barring this sort of monism, the situation will be more complicated. For example, suppose 
causing suffering is wrong, but many other things are, too. In that case, there will be, at best, a 
partial overlap between experiences as of suffering and experiences as of wrongness. This won’t 
change the basic issues, though, just make them more complicated.  
32 The inner quotation concerning what it is to lack “affective empathy” comes from Blair (2007, 
4). 
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possible for someone to perceive cat-torture—as both Sam and Pathos do—without 
having an experience as of wrongness—as only Sam does.33 
Of course, my opponent could argue that this is an exceptional case. As 
noted in §1, even if two experiences have the same phenomenal content, it might be 
possible to have one without the other, say if one lacks the ability to apply a certain 
concept to that content. Perhaps this is the case here: Perhaps Sam and Pathos 
actually have identical experiences—or, at least, any difference is a reaction to, 
rather than a part of, the experience grounding their non-moral perception—but 
only Sam is able to conceive of it as an experience as of wrongness. This simply 
doesn’t have the ring of truth, as they say—especially if there are cases where 
Pathos can appropriately apply moral concepts (perhaps ones not requiring 
empathy). It seems much more natural to think that Sam’s experience as of 
wrongness is something over and above the experience as of cat-torture he and 
Pathos share. 
Alice’s case is even less helpful to my opponent. For Alice’s case is entirely 
intrapersonal. Clearly, it is possible for Alice to experience the non-moral features 
of Bob and Chuck’s relationship without having an experience as of permissibility, 
for this is precisely what she does at the beginning of the story! It is only after 
constant interaction with them that she comes to see their relationship as 
permissible. It’s hard to see how this could be an exceptional case.34  
If I’m right, the unhelpfulness of these cases is not accidental. Rather, it is a 
symptom of a consistent phenomenal gap between moral and non-moral 
experiences. I am inclined to accept a sort of phenomenal parallel of some classic 
arguments about moral semantics:35 For any way I might experience the world non-
                                                 
33 The claim that EEDIs have a theory of mind serves to block the alternative that only Sam 
perceives certain relevant non-moral features of the cat-torture, such as the cat’s suffering. 
34 Another way to push back here stems from the idea of undercutting penetration (i.e., 
mediation). See note 16, above. The idea would be that experiences as of suffering and 
experiences as of wrongness have the same phenomenal content, but certain background beliefs 
can penetrate the experience to undercut perception of one while retaining perception of the 
other. This seems possible, but I doubt it can be what’s going on in these cases. Think back to 
Vera. Suppose she learns that there are a lot of motorcyclists wearing bus-façades on her current 
route. When she gets cut off, she might fail to perceive a bus. But surely her experience would 
still be relevantly bus-like. If we asked her if she saw a bus, she’d presumably reply that she 
seemed to, but knows it very likely wasn’t a bus. In contrast, it seems that Pathos and early Alice 
don’t even have the relevant moral seemings.  
35 E.g., Moore’s (1903) open question argument, Hare’s (e.g., 1952) missionaries and cannibals, 
and Horgan and Timmons’ (e.g., 1991) Moral Twin Earth. 
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morally, it is possible for me to fail to experience it morally in any particular way.36 
So moral and non-moral experiences must have different phenomenal contents.   
Of course, not everyone shares these intuitions. Analytic naturalists, for 
instance, maintain that there are some conceptually necessary connections between 
moral and non-moral properties. It is not hard to believe that they would further 
(indeed perhaps because of this) maintain that some moral and non-moral 
experiences have the same phenomenal content. They may be able to defend 
unmediated moral perception. I have done what I can to cast doubt on this. I will 
thus move on to consider the implications for a purely perceptual moral 
epistemology, assuming I’m right that epistemically successful moral perception 
would have to be mediated. 
   
3. Against Perceptual Knowledge of Moral Bridge Principles 
In this section, I argue that if epistemically successful moral perception is mediated 
by knowledge of moral bridge principles, there can be no purely perceptual moral 
epistemology. Those seeking to offer a purely perceptual moral epistemology would 
have to offer a purely perceptual epistemology for those bridge principles. If moral 
perception is mediated, they cannot.  
Suppose Sam knows that cat-torture is wrong. Here are three ways—
arguably, the only three ways—he might know this: 
(1) Sam knows the principle a priori.   
(2) Sam knows the principle through perception. 
(3) Sam infers the principle from background knowledge. 
I will start by setting aside views on which moral bridge principles are 
analytic. This is not because I think such views are false but because, as discussed in 
§2.3, they may be able to vindicate unmediated moral perception, and thus needn’t 
                                                 
36 I’m inclined to think this just is a Moorean intuition. Can one accept both Moorean intuitions 
and that moral and non-moral experiences can have the same content? Sort of. Suppose Carla 
gained her concept ‘wrong’ by ostension. At a young age, when confronted with certain things, 
she was told: That is wrong. She might thus claim that when confronted with suffering today, 
she has an experience as of wrongness. Nevertheless, she might still accept the Moorean intuition 
that, conceptually, being suffering isn’t actually sufficient for being wrong. I’m not sure how 
psychologically plausible this is. But even if it is, it provides a rather hollow victory for the 
optimist about unmediated moral perception. For in order to develop a purely perceptual moral 
epistemology, we need to account for the knowledge of whoever pointed those wrong things out 
to her. Suppose we trace this back to the origin of the concept. Moorean intuitions seem to block 
the idea that this origin could itself be ostensive. This is importantly different from certain non-
moral cases. For instance, not only might Vera have gained the concept ‘bus’ via ostension; it 
seems the origin of that concept might have been ostensive, too.  
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worry about my arguments in this section. On the other hand, the principle’s being 
an instance of synthetic a priori knowledge is obviously incompatible with an 
attempt to develop a purely perceptual epistemology for it. So (1) provides no 
additional hope for those who would defend a purely perceptual moral 
epistemology. 
Moving to (2): If perception of principles is even possible, it surely must be 
mediated. After all, principles are not the sorts of things that can directly explain 
our perceptions of them. What sort of background knowledge might mediate such 
perception? So far as I can see, the only candidate would be knowledge of the 
principle’s relata. If this is to be purely perceptual, knowledge of the relata would 
have to be perceptual. In a moral bridge principle, though, one of the relata is a 
moral property. Since the possibility of purely perceptual knowledge of moral 
properties is precisely what is at issue, (2) serves only to move the bump in the rug.  
This brings us to (3). In order for (3) to help the defender of a purely 
perceptual moral epistemology, the inference in question would have to be 
somehow grounded in perception. To see how this might go, return to Cliff2’s 
perception of H20. Cliff2 has an experience as of water. He also perceives H20—a 
perception mediated by his knowledge that water is H20. How does he know that 
water is H20? A while back, he collected some samples of water and looked at them 
under a high-powered microscope. He noticed that, in all cases, the samples had the 
molecular structure of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom. Given this, plus 
further (we may presume perceptual) knowledge about molecular behavior, Cliff2 
concluded that the best explanation for this consistent correlation is that water is 
H20.37 We might thus conclude that, despite being mediated, Cliff2’s knowledge is 
purely perceptual.38 
Suppose Sam claims that his knowledge that cat-torture is wrong works 
much the same way: At some point in the past, he had multiple correlated 
perceptions of wrongness and of cat-torture (yikes!), and inferred that the best 
explanation for this is the truth of the principle that cat-torture is wrong. I accept, 
for the sake of argument, that this is a live possibility. Importantly, it still won’t 
permit Sam to conclude that his knowledge here is purely perceptual. 
To see why, recall that we are assuming that Sam’s perceptions of 
wrongness are mediated by knowledge of moral bridge principles. Clearly, if he 
                                                 
37 Drawing this conclusion about property identity might require further, non-empirical 
philosophical knowledge about the nature of property identity, but Cliff could make do with a 
weaker relation, such as consistent correlation.   
38 One might wish to resist this conclusion. Perhaps Cliff2’s abductive inference relies on 
something a priori, for instance. Since this would only serve to weaken the case for purely 
perceptual knowledge of moral bridge principles, I set it aside. 
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claims to know that cat-torture is wrong via abduction from correlated perceptions 
of wrongness and cat-torture, the relevant background knowledge can’t be that cat-
torture is wrong. His perceptions of wrongness must have been mediated by other 
knowledge—say, the bridge principle causing suffering is wrong as well as his 
knowledge that cat-torture causing suffering.  
We are now left to ask how Sam knows that causing suffering is wrong. 
Suppose that, again, he claims to have arrived at this principle via abduction from 
multiple correlated perceptions of wrongness and of suffering (it’s been a bad year). 
If so, there must be some further bridge principle that mediated his perceptions of 
wrongness in those cases. And we must ask how Sam knows that principle. If we 
are to avoid an unhelpful regress, at some point Sam must gain the relevant 
knowledge in some other way.39    
Assuming these are indeed the only options, we may conclude that while 
there may be perceptual knowledge of some moral bridge principles, others—
specifically, the fundamental ones—must be known non-perceptually. It follows that 
there can be no purely perceptual epistemology for moral bridge principles. If all 
moral perception is indeed mediated by knowledge of such principles, it further 
follows that there can be no purely perceptual moral epistemology. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The potential epistemological advantages of defending moral perception are highly 
seductive. Given the myriad explanatory challenges facing any metaethical view, it 
would be an incredible boon to be able to say that we know about the instantiation 
of moral properties in much the same way as we know that there is a bus passing in 
front of us. Unfortunately, even if we sometimes perceive moral properties, this 
alone isn’t sufficient to grant that benefit. For moral perceptions may be mediated 
by background knowledge which is not itself perceptual. I have argued that unless 
some moral and non-moral experiences have the same phenomenal content, moral 
perception would have to be mediated. I further argued that if moral perception is 
mediated, knowledge of the mediating moral bridge principles could not itself be 
purely perceptual.  
Before concluding, I’ll note two potential further implications of my 
arguments in this paper. The first is rather obvious: My arguments might be taken 
to support moral rationalism. Looking back to §3, it seems that of the three options 
presented, all but (1) depend on background moral knowledge. This might indicate 
that knowledge of the fundamental moral principles must be a priori.  
                                                 
39 Compare Zangwill (2006). 
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Second, my argument that epistemically successful moral perception must 
mediated by knowledge of moral bridge principles might be taken to have 
problematic implications for moral particularism. Whether this is the case will 
depend, for one, on whether the kinds of principles involved in mediation of moral 
perception are the same as those particularists reject.  
Both issues are too complex to be addressed here. I mention them by way of 
sowing seeds to be cultivated elsewhere, as it were. Here, my conclusion is that, 
insofar as moral and non-moral experiences have different phenomenal content, 
moral knowledge cannot be purely perceptual. 
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